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EBP: Where Rigor Matters. 
Nancy Cartwright and Alexandre Marcellesi1 
 
1. A plea for rigor in evidence-based policy 
Pat Suppes teaches two great lessons about rigor: 
• Rigor matters. 
• A little rigor can be a dangerous thing. 
Our focus in this paper is on an area where rigor is badly needed and where it is highly touted but 
where Nancy is in trouble for insisting on it: the movements that go under the labels ‘evidence-
based medicine’ and ‘evidence-based social policy’, which typically assert---in the interest of 
rigor---that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard in evidence. (We shall 
refer to both together as ‘EBP’ for short.) For instance, at a recent conference on evidence and 
causality, Sir Iain Chalmers, who was founding director of the UK Cochrane Collaboration 
(which oversees evidence-based medicine) and whose knighthood is for his contributions to 
healthcare, put some formulas of Nancy’s, similar to ones we shall use here, up on the screen and 
made fun of them as both useless and unintelligible. But EBP is an area where rigor matters. The 
1 Both authors would like to thank the Templeton Foundation’s project ‘God’s Order, Man’s 
Order and the Order of Nature’ as well as the AHRC project 'Choices of evidence: tacit 
philosophical assumptions in debates on evidence-based practice in children's welfare services' 
for support for the research and writing of this paper. Nancy Cartwright would in addition like to 
thank the British Academy, which funded her project ‘Evidence for Use’, as well as the Institute 
for International, Comparative and Area Studies at UC San Diego for the ‘Political civility and 
scientific objectivity’ grant.  
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problem is that Suppes’s second lesson is often ignored. There’s too much rigor at one stage of 
the argument it takes to support a policy recommendation and very little thereafter---and that 
without mention. Yet it is well known that an argument is only as strong as its weakest premise. 
Downplaying the other premises that do not have solid support and stressing the rigor of the one 
premise gives a false sense of security. And this can be dangerous when policy decisions are at 
stake. 
 
The EBP movement has generated a number of evidence hierarchies, grading systems for 
evidence, organizations and methods to review evidence pertaining to proposed 
treatments/interventions/policies, and warehouses where policies that pass review can be found. 
The evidence hierarchies rank not individual pieces of evidence but rather methods for the 
production of evidence, with well-conducted RCTs or systematic reviews or meta-analyses of 
well-conducted RCTs at the top. The hierarchies are then deployed by the various review 
organizations to evaluate how strongly supported treatments or policies are. 
 
What you should have noticed right away is how vague our description is. Evidence is always 
evidence for some specific claim. Treatments aren’t the kinds of things that have evidence. So 
what are the claims about treatments or policies that evidence regarded as good by the EBP 
movement is supposed to be good for? There’s the rub. It is really difficult to get a clear 
statement about this. We’ll give a short survey of some of the major sites and what they say in 
section 2. In section 3 we will look at the favored method in the EBP movement---the RCT. We 
will first propose one general form that an evidence claim that an RCT produces can take:  “C 
causes E in (study population) A” or, to use a loose slogan: “It works somewhere”. Second, 
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using a version of Suppes’s probabilistic theory of causality, we will sketch one rigorous 
argument that RCTs can certify this kind of claim in the ideal. Section 4 first proposes a form for 
the final hypothesis EBP is trying to provide evidence for: “C causes E in (target population) A’” 
or, “It will work here”. Second we will sketch a rigorous argument for establishing claims of this 
form taking the “It works somewhere” claims RCTs can establish as a starting premise. Thus we 
restore rigor by laying out an entire argument that starts with the assumption of a successful 
outcome in an ideal RCT and ends with the desired conclusion.  
 
So…What’s to make fun of about this?  
 
2. What the ‘rigor’ in EBP frameworks looks like 
2.1 Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) 
The GRADE working group is one of the most prominent advocates of the use of standardized 
grading schemes to assess the quality of evidence. It is particularly influential in evidence-based 
medicine: its grading schemes have been adopted by healthcare organizations such as the World 
Health Organization and the American College of Physicians, but also by vetting agencies such 
as Iain Chalmers’ own Cochrane Collaboration. 
 
GRADE offers two different grading schemes, one for the strength of recommendations to treat 
(strong, weak) and one for the quality of evidence (high, moderate, low, very low). A 
recommendation for a treatment is the output of a decision process that takes three elements as 
inputs: (i) an analysis of the (health-related) costs and benefits of this treatment, (ii) an 
assessment of the quality of the evidence supporting this cost-benefit analysis, and (iii) the 
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values and preferences of patients. What the GRADE evidence scheme ranks is the quality of the 
evidence supporting the estimates of the benefits and harms of a treatment that are to feed into 
the cost-benefit analysis for this treatment.  
 
These estimates of benefits and harms are estimates of treatment effects. Witness, for instance, 
what the GRADE authors says about the impact of deficiencies in RCTs on the quality of 
evidence: “Our confidence in the evidence decreases if the available randomized controlled trials 
suffer from major deficiencies that are likely to result in a biased assessment of the treatment 
effect.” (http://www.gradeworkinggroup.org/FAQ/index.htm, emphasis added). 
  
GRADE’s approach to grading evidence is detailed in two series of articles published in the 
British Medical Journal (BMJ) and the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology (JCE). Throughout 
these articles, the authors of GRADE talk about ‘the effects of treatments’ in general, not in 
particular populations at particular times, implicitly assuming a ‘narrow’ conception according to 
which the effect of a treatment depends exclusively on what the treatment is and not on who 
receives it at what time and in what setting. The only place in which populations are discussed is 
the JCE article warning users of GRADE about the threats of ‘indirect’ evidence. 
  
One way in which evidence for the effectiveness of an intervention can be indirect is by there 
being a difference between the target population and the study populations (Guyatt et al. 2011b, 
§2.1). The GRADE authors make the following recommendation about how to react when a 
worry of indirectness arises: 
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In general, one should not rate down [evidence] for population differences unless one has 
compelling reason to think that the biology in the population of interest is so different 
from that of the population tested that the magnitude of effect will differ substantially. 
Most often, this will not be the case. (op. cit., 1304-1305) 
The GRADE authors do not provide a justification for the claim made in the last sentence of this 
quotation and, most importantly, they ignore potential behavioral and environmental differences 
between populations that may make an important difference to the effect of the treatment (just 
think of a case in which the condition targeted is high blood pressure, for instance). The problem 
created by the possible existence of relevant differences between study and target populations is 
thus dismissed without much argument. And users of GRADE are advised to make the default 
assumption that estimates of treatment effects obtained from a particular study population at a 
particular time can easily ‘travel’ to other populations and other times. 
  
It is true that, without making this assumption, interpreting the results of meta-analyses becomes 
very difficult. Consider the example of a meta-analysis of the effect of antibiotics on acute otitis 
media in children given in (Guyatt et al. 2011a, 387-388, tables 1 & 2). The GRADE authors 
report estimates for various effects of this treatment, e.g. pain at 24h, that are aggregates of the 
estimates produced by several studies, e.g. five RCTs for pain at 24h. Unless one assumes that 
these five estimates produced by RCTs conducted on five distinct study populations are all 
estimates of the same thing, something like the effect of antibiotics on pain at 24h for children 
suffering from acute otitis in general, i.e. in any population, then it makes little sense to 
aggregate them into a single estimate. The problem, of course, is that neither the problematic 
assumption that there is such a thing as the effect of antibiotics on pain at 24h in general nor the 
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assumption that the five estimates that are aggregated are estimates of this particular effect are 
supported by either argument or evidence. 
 
This does not prevent GRADE from rating the quality of the evidence supporting this aggregated 
estimate as ‘High’. The reason for this rating is that the five studies from which this estimate is 
obtained all individually score highly on the GRADE criteria for quality of evidence, since they 
are all RCTs with no serious limitations, no serious inconsistencies, etc. According to the 
GRADE framework, to say that the quality of the evidence supporting this aggregate estimate is 
‘High’ is to say that, “We are very confident that the true effect lies close to that of the estimate 
of the effect.” (Balshem et al. 2011, 404, table 2). 
  
But the “true effect” of what? Of the treatment in the particular population you are interested in 
treating? Of the treatment in general, i.e. in any population you might want to treat? Of the 
treatment in a superpopulation composed of the five study populations involved in the five RCTs 
from which the aggregate estimate was obtained? Of the treatment in a superpopulation 
composed of the populations which the five study populations were sampled from? Without a 
clear and principled answer to this question, it is difficult to interpret the aggregate estimate 
produced by the meta-analysis presented by the GRADE authors and, as a consequence, it is 
difficult to assess the quality of the evidence supporting this estimate. The evidence supporting 
the aggregate estimate might be good if what the “true effect” is happens to be the effect of the 
treatment in a superpopulation composed of the five study populations, but need not be if it is the 
effect of the treatment in the population you are interested in treating. 
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2.2 Oxford Center for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM) 
The CEBM promotes EBP and produces evidence grading schemes. The most recent CEBM 
levels of evidence (http://www.cebm.net/index.aspx?o=5513) offer different rankings of study 
designs, and of the evidence they produce, depending on the question one is interested in 
answering (e.g. Does this intervention help? What are the common harms? Etc.) The evidence 
that gets ranked by the CEBM levels of evidence thus is assumed to be evidence supporting 
particular answers to these questions. 
 
Consider the question that most resembles ours: 'Does this intervention help?'. The CEBM 
rankings tell you that the best evidence for answers to this question is produced by systematic 
reviews of RCTs, systematic reviews that often take the form of meta-analyses. Just as in the 
case of GRADE, then, meta-analyses of RCTs are considered to produce the best evidence. But 
just as in the case of GRADE, the CEBM levels of evidence do not tell you exactly what the 
evidence produced by these meta-analyses of RCTs, or by RCTs individually, is supposed to be 
evidence for. 
  
One will say: ‘But they are evidence that the intervention helps (or doesn’t help)!’ What does it 
mean, however, to say that an intervention ‘helps’? The same questions arise as before: Is it to 
say that it helped in some study population in which it was implemented? That it helps in every 
population in which it is implemented? That it will help in the population in which you intend to 
implement it? Again, as in the case of GRADE, it is not clear how one can rate the quality of 
evidence without a clear answer to this question. An individual RCT might provide very good 
evidence if the question asked is whether the intervention helped in the study population on 
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which this very RCT was conducted, but not if the question asked is whether the intervention 
helps in every population in which one might implement it. 
 
2.3 California Evidence-Based Clearinghouse for Child Welfare (CEBC) 
The CEBC is a vetting agency that, unlike the Cochrane Collaboration, has its own evidence 
grading scheme. This grading scheme, which its authors call a ‘Scientific rating scale’, has five 
levels (from ‘Well-Supported by Research Evidence’ to ‘Concerning Practice’), each level being 
defined by a list of criteria (http://www.cebc4cw.org/ratings/scientific-rating-scale/). According 
to its authors, this ‘Scientific rating scale’ is “a 1 to 5 rating of the strength of the research 
evidence supporting a practice or program.” Of course, as for the EBP frameworks considered 
above, it is not made clear whether what is assessed is the evidence supporting the effectiveness 
of the program in the study population, in the target population, or in any population one might 
want to treat. 
  
A quick look at the grading scheme, however, is enough to see that even their own vague 
description is not right. The CEBC grading scheme mixes together (i) whether a program’s 
positive effects outweigh its negative effects and (ii) the strength of the evidence supporting this 
cost-benefit analysis. The fifth and lowest level, for instance, clearly is not a level of quality of 
evidence. This level, called ‘Concerning Practice’, is the level at which should be classified 
interventions such that “the overall weight of evidence suggests the intervention has a negative 
effect upon clients served”. To present this ‘Scientific rating scale’ as ranking evidence thus is 
misleading and has the potential to confuse its users. 
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The tutorial video accompanying the CEBC evidence grading scheme does little to clarify the 
way this ranking scheme is supposed to work (http://www.cebc4cw.org/ratings/scientific-rating-
scale/scientific-rating-scale-tutorial/). Consider, for instance, its use of the metaphor of the 
‘solidness of evidence’: This video tells you to see evidence as a foundation, with the five levels 
of the evidence ranking scheme corresponding respectively to rock, gravel, sand, water, and gas 
foundations (from level 1 to level 5). It does not tell you, however, what this foundation is 
supposed to be a foundation for: What are you to build on top of your evidence? And the 
metaphor of the ‘solidness of evidence’ also fails to be faithful to the content of the CEBC 
grading scheme since, as we argued above, this ranking is not properly seen as a ranking of 
evidence. Consider again the fifth level of the ranking: If the overall weight of evidence suggests 
that a practice has negative effects, then the verdict that the practice has negative effects is 
presumably not based upon a gas foundation (otherwise why trust that any practice ranked at this 
level really has negative effects?). 
 
The CEBC ranking scheme provides a striking example of pretend rigor: The use of expressions 
such as “Scientific Rating Process” or “Scientific Rating Scale” that is “Based on a Continuum” 
to describe the CEBC grading scheme stands in stark contrast with the lack of rigor in either the 
grading scheme itself or in the explanations and tutorial video accompanying it. 
 
2.4 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s National Registry of 
Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP).  
The NREPP is an agency that vets policies in the domain of mental health. Like the CEBC, it has 
its own system for grading the quality of evidence. This system grades six aspects (Reliability of 
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measures, Validity of measures, Intervention fidelity, Absence of confounders, etc.) of studies on 
a 0.0-4.0 scale. The authors of NREPP’s evidence grading scheme claim that, “NREPP’s Quality 
of Research ratings are indicators of the strength of the evidence supporting the outcomes of the 
intervention. Higher scores indicate stronger, more compelling evidence.” 
(http://nrepp.samhsa.gov/ReviewQOR.aspx) As in the cases examined above, however, it is not 
made clear what is meant by “the intervention”. Is it the intervention as it was implemented in 
the study population? The intervention as it might be implemented in any population? The 
intervention as it might be implemented in the population you are interested in? 
 
Some of the criteria that serve to grade studies, moreover, are stated in rather vague terms. To get 
a 4 on ‘Appropriateness of [statistical] analysis’, for instance, a study must satisfy the following 
conditions: “Analyses were appropriate for inferring relationships between intervention and 
outcome. Sample size and power were adequate.” (http://nrepp.samhsa.gov/ReviewQOR.aspx) 
What does it mean for sample size and power to be “adequate”? And adequate for what purpose?  
In their presentation of it, the authors of NREPP’s grading system do not state clearly whether 
the six different scores a study receives are to be aggregated (nor, if so, how) to give an overall 
‘Quality of Research’ rating. Looking at the NREPP’s database of evaluations, however, one 
notices that the six scores received by a study are in fact aggregated. How are they aggregated? 
Again, no explicit information is given regarding the method followed. In fact, the overall 
‘Quality of Research’ rating attributed to a study simply is the average of the six scores it 
receives. 
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This is an odd choice, since not all the criteria determining the quality of the evidence produced 
by a study seem equally important. ‘Intervention Fidelity’, which requires that the intervention 
be implemented exactly as it was designed to be, does not seem nearly as important as 
(controlling for) ‘Potential Confounding Variables’ for instance. One would think a weighted 
average to be more appropriate. One might even think that a study that receives a score of 0 on 
‘Potential Confounding Variables’ should receive an overall score of 0. 
  
So, not only is it not clear what the evidence ranked by the NREPP’s scheme is supposed to be 
evidence for, it is also not clear why anybody should believe that higher overall scores “indicate 
stronger, more compelling evidence.” 
 
2.5 Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN) 
SIGN is a vetting agency that produces guidelines or recommendations regarding healthcare 
policy for Scotland’s National Health Services. It is a user, rather than a producer, of evidence 
grading schemes. SIGN, like the Cochrane Collaboration, has adopted (in 2009) GRADE’s 
scheme for grading evidence. It is interesting to see how a vetting agency such as SIGN 
understands the evidence grading scheme it relies on. The authors of SIGN’s handbook explicitly 
take the evidence grading scheme used by their framework to rank evidence for effectiveness 
predictions: 
It is important to emphasise that the grading does not relate to the importance of the 
recommendation, but to the strength of the supporting evidence and, in particular, to the 
predictive power of the study designs from which these data were obtained. Thus, the 
grading assigned to a recommendation indicates to users the likelihood that, if that 
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recommendation is implemented, the predicted outcome will be achieved. (SIGN 2011, 
34, emphasis original) 
This passage illustrates the assumption that seems to underlie EBP frameworks in general, 
including the ones examined above, namely that the ‘best’ study designs (i.e. systematic reviews 
of RCTs, or individual RCTs) automatically and straightforwardly produce evidence that is 
relevant, and sufficient, to warrant predictions regarding the effectiveness of policies that have 
yet to be implemented. 
  
Unfortunately, this assumption is mistaken and one needs an argument of the kind to be 
presented in section 4 in order to go from the result of an RCT to a well-supported effectiveness 
prediction. There is thus little sense in talking about the “predictive power” of systematic 
reviews of RCTs, for instance, and in interpreting evidence grading schemes as ranking studies 
according to their predictive power. 
  
2.6 So what? 
The five EBP frameworks considered above all value methodological rigor highly. This is why 
they systematically rank RCTs (and systematic reviews of RCTs) at the top of the evidence 
grading schemes they use and expert opinion at the very bottom. What’s more rigorous than a 
well-conducted RCT? And what’s less rigorous than unchecked opinion, even if that of an 
expert? What an examination of a sample of these frameworks reveals, however, is that they lack 
rigor in key places. If you put forth a scheme for grading evidence, then, unlike the CEBC 
scheme, it should rank evidence, and evidence only. If you give an overall numerical score to 
studies, as the NREPP rating system does, then you should clearly explain how this score is 
12 
 
computed and justify the choices involved in this computation. Most importantly, your evidence 
grading scheme should state clearly what the evidence it ranks is evidence for. 
 
All the evidence grading schemes considered above equivocate on this last point. They never 
clearly answer the questions we keep underlining: What is the evidence ranked evidence for? Is 
it evidence that the intervention was effective in the study population? Is it evidence that the 
intervention will be effective in most population? Is it evidence that the intervention will be 
effective in every population? Is it evidence that the intervention will be effective in the 
population in which you want to implement it? We repeat this point once more not at the risk of 
boring the reader because it is of crucial importance. Ranking evidence without a clear answer to 
this question is vain. You cannot evaluate how good the evidence for a particular claim is unless 
you are clear on what this claim says. 
  
What we do below is to explain what claims the evidence ranked by evidence grading schemes is 
generally in fact evidence for and explain why RCTs are thought to be very good at supporting 
claims of this kind. We also explain how to bridge the gap from the kinds of claims supported by 
RCTs, i.e. claims of the form “It works somewhere”, to predictions of the effectiveness of 
interventions, i.e. claims of the form “It will work here”. 
 
3. The starting point: RCTs 
3.1 The probabilistic theory of causality 
What’ so good about RCTs? They are supposed to be a very good way---some insist, the only 
way---for controlling for unknown confounders. See for instance what the webpage of MIT’s 
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Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) has to say about RCTs: The reader is told that 
“randomized evaluations do the best job” at controlling for unknown confounders because they 
“generate a statistically identical comparison group, and therefore produce the most accurate 
(unbiased) results” while “other methods often produce misleading results” 
(http://www.povertyactionlab.org/methodology/why/why-randomize). And how did 
‘confounders’, known or unknown, enter the discussion? Let’s start back, way behind where the 
usual defence of RCTs begins, to get a more rigorous account. Confounders enter when we are 
trying to establish causal claims.  So we shall begin with the probabilistic theory of causality. We 
shall not, though, use the theory in exactly the form Suppes first put it, but in a modified version 
Nancy has developed building from Suppes’ account (Cartwright 1979). For simplicity we will 
consider only yes-no variables.  
 
Suppose then that the notion of causality at stake satisfies the following constraint: 
Probabilistic causality:  For any population A, C causes E in A iff for some A(i) ⊆ A 
every member of which satisfies Ki, PA(i)(E/C&Ki) > PA(i)(E/¬C&Ki) where Ki is a state 
description2 over a full set of causes of E, barring C itself.  
The expression ‘a full set of causes’ takes some further paraphernalia to characterize. It can be 
done either relative to a formulation of the causal principles that govern A or to a set of causal 
pathways into E that obtain for A, where a full set of causal factors for E will contain one node 
from every pathway into E. We shall here leave it undefined. The factors that go into the Ks are 
just the ‘confounding factors’ that RCT advocates are concerned about. We shall use the term 
2 A state description over factors A1,…,An is a conjunction on n conjuncts, one for each Ai, with 
each conjunct either Ai or ¬Ai.  
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‘causal structure’ from now on. A causal structure for outcome E in A is a set {CA, PA}, where 
CA is a full set of causal factors for E in A and PA is a probability measure that holds in A over 
the space generated by CA ⋃ {E}. 
 
Note first that this theory uses the notion of causality on the right-hand-side and hence cannot 
provide a reductive definition for causation. It does however provide an important constraint 
between probability and causality, which is a good thing for our enterprise since the immediate 
results of RCTs are statistics. Second, a direct application of the formula requires a huge amount 
of antecedent causal knowledge before information about probabilistic dependencies between C 
and E can be used to determine if there is a causal link between them.  The RCT is designed 
specifically to finesse our lack of information about what other causes can affect E. Third, the 
theory allows that C may both cause E and prevent E (i.e., cause ¬E) in one and the same 
population, as one might wish to say about certain anti-depressants that can, it seems, both 
heighten and diminish depression in teenagers. This is especially important to note when it 
comes to RCTs since the effect size measured in an RCT averages over different arrangements of 
confounding factors so that the cause may increase the probability of the effect in some of these 
arrangements and decrease it in others and still produce an increase in the average. 
  
3.2 Ideal RCTs 
We shall describe the simplest basic structure, to make the argument outline clear. RCTs have 
two wings---a treatment group where every member receives the cause under test and a control 
group, in which any occurrences of the cause arise ‘naturally’ and which may receive a placebo. 
In the design of real RCTs three features loom large: 
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a. Maskings of all sorts. The subjects should not know if they are receiving the cause or 
not; the attendant monitors should not know; those identifying whether the effect occurs 
or not in an individual should not know; nor should anyone involved in recording or 
analyzing the data. This helps ensure that no differences slip in between treatment and 
control wings due to differences in attitudes, expectations, or hopes of anyone involved in 
the process. 
b. Random assignment of subjects to the treatment or control wings. This is in aid of 
ensuring that other possible reasons for dependencies and independencies between the 
cause and effect under test will be distributed identically in the treatment and control 
wings. 
c. Careful choice of a placebo to be given to the control, where a placebo is an item 
indiscernible both for subjects of the experiment and for those administering the 
experiment from the cause except for being causally ‘inert’ with respect to the targeted 
effect. This is supposed to ensure that any ‘psychological’ effects produced by the 
recognition that a subject is receiving the treatment will be the same in both wings.  
These are in aid of bringing the real RCT as close as possible to an ideal RCT. An RCT is ideal 
for testing “C causes E in A” iff the probability of all combinations of causal factors in A of E 
are the same in both wings except for C and except for factors that C produces in the course of 
producing E, whose distribution differs between the two groups only due to the action of C in the 
treatment wing. Suppose for simplicity PA(C) in the treatment wing = 1 and PA(C) in the control 
wing = 0. An outcome in an RCT is positive if PA(E) in the treatment wing > PA(E) in the control 
wing. 
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As before, designate state descriptions over a full set of causal factors other than C for E in A by 
Ki. In an ideal RCT each Ki will appear in both wings with the same probability, wi. Then PA(E) 
in treatment wing = ∑wiPA(E/C&Ki) and PA(E) in control wing = ∑wiPA(E/¬C&Ki). So a 
positive outcome occurs only if for some i, PA(E/C&Ki) > PA(E/¬C&Ki). Thus a positive 
outcome in an ideal RCT for C cause E in A occurs only if C causes E in some A(i) ⊆ A,and 
hence only if C causes E in A by the probabilistic theory of causality. 
 
The RCT is neat, at least in the ideal, because it allows us to learn causal conclusions without 
knowing what the confounding factors are. By definition of an ideal RCT, these are distributed 
equally in both the treatment and control wing, so that when a difference in probability of the 
effect between treatment and control wings appears, we can infer that there is an arrangement of 
confounding factors in which C and E are probabilistically dependent and hence in that 
arrangement C causes E. It is of course not clear how closely any real RCT approximates the 
ideal. 
  
Notice that a positive outcome does not preclude that C causes E in some subpopulation of the 
experimental population and also prevents E in some other. Again, certain anti-depressants are a 
good example. They have positive RCT results and yet are believed to be helpful for some 
teenagers and harmful for others.3 
 
 
3 See for instance the U.S. Food and Drug Administration medication guide at 
www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIMedicationGuide.htm   
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4. The destination: a prediction of effectiveness 
Out of the morass of vague expressions reviewed in section 2 of what the evidence in EBP is 
supposed to be evidence for, let’s take SIGN’s formulation to express the basic idea: “Thus the 
grading assigned to a recommendation indicates to users the likelihood that, if that 
recommendation is implemented, the predicted outcome will be achieved.” We take it that this is 
meant to be some kind of causal claim; and also that the users constitute some new population A’ 
different from any experimental population A. Let’s suppose then that the target claim that we 
aim to produce evidence for is C causes E in A’. This is a fairly weak claim recall, since it is 
consistent with it being true that C also causes ¬E in A’. Why should a positive RCT result for C 
causes E in A speak in any way for the truth of C causes E in A’? 
 
It will do so if these conditions for RCT relevance are both satisfied: 
R1. Populations A and A’ have the same causal structure for E.  
R2. One of the Ki that picks out a subset of A such that “C causes E in A(i)” holds also picks 
out a subset of A’ that has members. 
Of course it will also do so under weaker conditions. The weakest seem to be if both R3. and R4. 
are satisfied: 
R3. C is in CA  C is in CA’. 
R4. PA’(E/C&Ki) > PA’(E/¬C&Ki) for some i, where K’s are state descriptions over CA’---
{C}. 
That is, C is a cause in A only if it is a cause in A’ and there’s at least one causally homogeneous 
subpopulation of A’---picked out by the causal structure that holds in A’---where C acts 
positively and that subpopulation has a non-zero probability. 
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 The lesson to be learned is that although (ideal) RCTs are excellent at securing causal claims 
about the study population, there is a very great deal more that must be assumed---and defended-
--if those causal claims are to be exported from the experimental population to some target 
population. Advice on this front tends to be very poor indeed however. Recall GRADE’s 
recommendation to take as a default the assumption that experimental and target populations are 
sufficiently similar unless there’s good evidence to the contrary. Or consider the US Department 
of Education website, which teaches that two successful well-conducted RCTs in ‘typical’ 
schools or classrooms ‘like yours’ are ‘strong’ evidence that a programme will work in your 
school/classroom (USDE 2003, 10). 
  
This problem often goes under the label ‘external validity’. A study has external validity when 
the claim established in the study population (here A) holds in a target population (A’) as well.  
The Department of Education’s advice about external validity is typical: A study will have 
external validity with respect to a given target if the two populations involved are sufficiently 
similar.  The great advantage of a little rigor is that it can give content to this uselessly vague 
advice. From the point of view of the probabilistic theory of causality, ‘like yours’ can mean that 
R1. and R2. hold. At the very least, R3. and R4. must hold or the RCT results in A will be totally 
irrelevant to A’. Admittedly, these conditions are abstract so do not give much practical purchase 
on how to decide whether they obtain or not. But they are not, like the usual advice, without 
content. At least we know now just what kinds of similarity in what respects we need to look for. 
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5. Conclusion 
We have briefly explained how to make up for the lack of rigor in EBP frameworks when it 
comes to justifying the relevance of RCT results to effectiveness predictions, that is, when it 
comes to bridging the gap between “It works somewhere” and “It will work here”. The account 
sketched here using the probabilistic theory of causality that originates with Pat Suppes has been 
developed in detail by Nancy together with Jeremy Hardie (2012). The argument taking one 
from RCT results to effectiveness predictions must be rigorous every step of the way in order for 
its conclusion to be properly supported by evidence. We urge practitioners and advocates of EBP 
not to focus solely on rigor in establishing the “It works somewhere” premise at the expense of 
rigor in establishing other premises that are equally necessary to yield the conclusion that “It will 
work here”. 
 
  
20 
 
References 
 
Balshem, H. et al. (2011). ‘GRADE guidelines: 3. Rating the quality of evidence’. Journal of 
Clinical Epidemiology, 64: 401-406. 
 
Cartwright, N. (1979). ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’. Noûs, 13: 419-437. 
 
Cartwright, N., and J. Hardie. (2012). Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing It 
Better. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Guyatt, G. et al. (2011a). ‘GRADE guidelines: 1. Introduction---GRADE evidence profiles and 
summary of findings tables’. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 64: 383-394. 
 
Guyatt, G. et al. (2011b). ‘GRADE guidelines: 8. Rating the quality of evidence---indirectness’. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 64: 1303-1310. 
 
SIGN. (2011). SIGN 50: A guideline developer’s handbook. Edinburgh: NHS Scotland. 
 
USDE. (2003). Identifying and Implementing Educational Practices Supported by Rigorous 
Evidence: A User Friendly Guide. Washington, DC: Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy. 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/rigorousevid/index.html.  
21 
 
